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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900148 
v* t 
DONALD WAYNE BROWN, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from convictions of second degree 
murder, a first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 
(1990), and aggravated assault, a third degree felony, under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeals 
1. Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's 
motion to suppress certain evidence seized without a warrant from 
the trailer in which he resided? 
The factual findings underlying the trial court's 
ruling on the motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 
1258 (Utah 1987). However, in assessing the trial court's legal 
conclusions based on its factual findings, the appellate court 
applies a "correction of error" standard of review. State v. 
Palmer, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 43 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 14, 1990). 
Accord United States v. Butler, 904 F.2d 1482, 1484 (10th Cir. 
1990). But see State v. Galleqos, 712 P.2d 207, 208-09 (Utah 
1985) (which suggests that the "clearly erroneous" standard of 
review applies to both the trial court's factual determinations 
and legal conclusion). 
2. Did the trial court err in admitting evidence of 
defendant's prior bad acts? 
Defendant failed to preserve this issue for review. 
State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 
S. Ct. 62 (1989); State v. Van Matre, 777 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 
1989). 
3. Has defendant demonstrated that reversible error 
occurred when the prosecutor referred to him as a "mad dog" in 
closing argument? 
In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the 
Court "must determine if the prosecutor's remarks calls [sic] to 
the attention of the jurors matters they would not be justified 
in considering in reaching the verdict and, if so, whether there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the misconduct so prejudiced the 
jury that there would have been a more favorable result absent 
the misconduct." State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988). 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in giving 
an "Allen" charge to the jury? 
Defendant did not preserve for appeal his objection to 
the trial court's "Allen" instruction. State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 
1021, 1023 (Utah 1987). 
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
allowing the jury to deliberate for an extended period of time? 
The question of how long to keep the jury in 
deliberations is discretionary with the trial court; therefore, 
its decision will not be disturbed unless it abused its 
discretion. State v. Lactod# 761 P.2d 23, 31 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
6. Was there sufficient evidence to support 
defendant's conviction of aggravated assault? 
An appellate court will reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, "is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted." State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 
(Utah 1985) (citations omitted). 
7. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
assessing the costs of defense to defendant as part of his 
sentence? 
An appellate court will set aside a sentence imposed by 
a trial court only if the sentence represents an abuse of 
discretion, if the trial court fails to consider all relevant 
factors, or if the sentence imposed exceeds the limits prescribed 
by law. State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989). 
8. Did defendant preserve for appeal the issue of 
whether it was appropriate for a part-time city attorney to 
represent defendant as appointed counsel, and does he demonstrate 
that grounds for reversal exist on the basics of the record 
before this Court? 
Absent exceptional circumstances, this Court will not 
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Steqqell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983). Also, this Court will 
not rule on a question that depends for its existence on alleged 
facts unsupported by the record. State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 
289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983). 
9. Was defendant denied effective assistance of 
counsel at trial? 
A defendant who raises a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel must show both that counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and that a 
reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's deficient 
performance, the result of the trial would have been different. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Donald Wayne Brown, was charged with second 
degree murder, a first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-203 (1990), and two counts of aggravated assault, a third 
degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990) (R. 2-5). 
After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of 
second degree murder and one count of aggravated assault (R. 
423-25). The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms at 
the Utah State Prison of five years to life for the murder and 
zero to five years for the aggravated assault (R. 427-29). The 
court also ordered defendant to pay restitution and costs (R. 
428). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A lengthy recitation of the facts of defendant's crimes 
is not necessary to the resolution of the issues raised on 
appeal. Defendant's convictions arose out of an incident in 
which he and others killed Miguel Rameriz and he assaulted 
Richard C. Anderson at a brine shrimp harvesting camp on the 
Great Salt Lake in October 1989. 
Additional facts pertinent to the issues raised on 
appeal are set forth in the argument portion of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress certain items seized by the police in a warrantless 
search of the trailer in which defendant resided when he worked 
for Western Brine Shrimp ("WSB"). The search was lawfully 
conducted pursuant to the consent of WSB's owner/property manager 
who had common authority over the common areas of the trailer 
searched. The items defendant challenges were properly seized 
under the plain view doctrine. 
Defendant was bound over to district court for trial on only 
one count of aggravated assault (R. 1). 
Defendant did not preserve for appeal his claim that 
the trial court admitted evidence of defendant's prior aggressive 
behavior in violation of rules 404 and 405, Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Defendant did not object to that evidence at trial on 
the same grounds he now presents on appeal. 
Defendant fails to demonstrate that reversible error 
occurred when the prosecutor referred to him as a "mad dog" in 
closing argument. Although the prosecutor's characterization of 
defendant as a "mad dogM in closing argument was probably 
improper, there is no reasonable likelihood that the improper 
remark so prejudiced the jury that there would have been a more 
favorable result for defendant in its absence. 
Defendant did not preserve for appeal his objection to 
the trial court's "Allen" instruction. Defendant did not object 
at trial to the instruction he now challenges on appeal. 
Defendant fails to demonstrate that the trial court 
abused its discretion in keeping the jury together for a period 
of 13*$ hours after a full day of trial. The trial court's denial 
of defendant's motion to recess the jury was consistent with 
reasoned authority from other jurisdictions. 
There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's 
conviction of aggravated assault. The jury reasonably exercised 
its preprogative in concluding that defendant's conduct amounted 
to a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or 
violence. 
Because it appears from the record that the trial court 
failed to consider the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-32A-3 
(1990) in ordering that defendant reimburse the county for the 
costs of his defense, this Court should remand the case to the 
trial court for reconsideration of this aspect of defendant's 
sentence. 
Defendant did not preserve for appeal the issue of 
whether it was appropriate for a part-time attorney to represent 
defendant as appointed counsel; alternatively, defendant fails to 
demonstrate that grounds for reversal exist on the basis of the 
record before this Court. Defendant did not object in the trial 
court to the appointment of counsel he now alleges was a part-
time city attorney and prosecutor who had an inherent conflict of 
interest. Furthermore, the record does not establish that 
appointed counsel held a prosecutor position at the time he 
represented defendant. 
Defendant fails to demonstrate that he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel at trial under the test 
enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT 
In response to a number of the issues raised by 
defendant in this appeal, the State argues that, because the 
issue was not raised in the trial court, it was not preserved for 
appeal and therefore should not be considered by this Court. The 
State cites case law from this Court that directly supports this 
position. However, a recent decision, State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 
798 (Utah 1990), has created some ambiguity concerning the 
application of well established waiver/procedural default rules, 
and has led to troublesome decisions from the Utah Court of 
Appeals• Therefore, because of its potential impact on the 
waiver arguments made in this brief, the State will first address 
the Jameson problem. 
In Jameson, an appeal from a probation revocation, the 
defendant argued that due to misconduct by the judge and the 
prosecutor, the constitutional prohibition against double 
jeopardy barred a second revocation hearing. Noting that this 
issue had been raised for the first time on appeal, a fact that 
would normally preclude review, the Court nevertheless considered 
itself obligated to address the defendant's argument "because it 
is based on a constitutional question and [the] defendant's 
liberty is at stake." 800 P.2d at 803. The Court did not 
explain this exception but simply cited to State v. Breckenridge, 
688 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1983), and Pratt v. City Council of 
Riverton, 639 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah 1981). 
In Breckenridge, the Court addressed issues concerning 
the validity of the defendant's guilty plea, raised for the first 
time at oral argument before the Court, because "[t]he general 
rule that constitutional issues not raised at trial cannot be 
raised on appeal is excepted to when a person's liberty are at 
stake." 688 P.2d at 443 (citing Pratt, 639 P.2d at 173-74). The 
Court, explaining the liberty interest at stake, said that 
because "Breckenridge's felony conviction and sentence rest on 
the outcome of his appeal," it would address the issue of the 
validity of his plea on a ground raised for the first time on 
appeal. Ibid. 
The difficulty with the liberty interest exception 
applied by the Breckenridqe Court to a criminal case is that, for 
all practical purposes, in a criminal case the defendant's 
liberty is always at stake. That is, it is always true that the 
defendant's "conviction and sentence rest on the outcome of his 
[or her] appeal." Breckenridqe, 688 P.2d at 443. Thus, on its 
face, the Breckenridqe liberty interest exception, although not 
frequently argued by defendants on appeal or relied upon by the 
Court, effectively eliminates waiver as a ground for not 
considering an issue raised for the first time on appeal. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has endeavored in two recent 
criminal cases to distinguish between issues where a liberty 
interest is at stake and those where that interest is not at 
stake. See State v. Harrison, 152 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 24 n.13 
(Utah Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1991) (no liberty interest at stake where 
issue concerned gender bias of prosecution's peremptory 
challenges; thus, issue would not be considered for first time on 
appeal); State v. Hargraves, No. 890684-CA, slip op. at 5-6 
(Utah Ct. App. Feb. 7, 1991) (challenge to search would be 
considered for first time on appeal; "a liberty interest is 
involved because the search produced evidence critical to 
Hargraves's conviction and incarceration"). The distinctions 
made in these two cases are at best questionable. Indeed, the 
court of appeals recognized the the difficulties inherent in 
applying the liberty interest exception in a criminal case. In 
Harrison, it wrote: 
We note a recent Utah Supreme Court 
opinion suggesting that when a constitutional 
question involving liberty is presented, the 
appellate court is "obliged" to consider it 
even though it was not raised in the trial 
court. State v. Jameson, 146 Utah Adv. Rep. 
3, 5 (1990). This "obligation" has not been 
evident in previous cases where Utah's 
appellate courts have refused to entertain 
constitutional challenges to criminal 
convictions, with incarceration (and 
therefore liberty) at stake, when those 
challenges had not been raised below. We 
believe that "the interest of predictability, 
accountability, and fairness" would be served 
by a more careful examination of when Utah's 
appellate courts will consider issues not 
raised in the trial courts. We further 
believe that the previously enunciated 
standards allowing first-time appellate 
review of issues are sufficiently liberal to 
provide appropriate redress, and are 
therefore troubled by a standard requiring 
review whenever a "liberty" interest is 
identified. 
Slip op. at 14-15 n.13 (citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original). 
The State agrees with the gist of the court of appeals' 
observations in Harrison: the liberty interest exception is not 
susceptible to predictable, consistent, and fair application in 
criminal cases, where the defendant's liberty interest is always 
at stake. If, in criminal cases, the waiver/procedural default 
rule is to continue as a viable basis for not reaching an issue 
raised for the first time on appeal, and if that rule is to be 
consistently and fairly applied, the Court should abandon any 
notion of a liberty interest exception and rely solely on the 
2 
plain error and exceptional circumstances exceptions to the 
2
 See State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah) (explaining 
plain error rule), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); Jolivet v. 
Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Utah 1989) (noting exceptional 
circumstances exception), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 751 (1990). 
waiver/procedural default rule when considering issues raised for 
the first time on appeal. The latter exceptions adequately and 
appropriately provide relief from waiver, without the inherent 
ambiguities associated with the liberty interest exception. 
Indeed, the Breckenridqe case, the genesis of the liberty 
interest exception in criminal cases, could have just as easily 
been decided under the plain error rule. In short, abandoning 
the liberty interest exception will not prejudice a criminal 
defendant's right to full and fair consideration of issues that 
should be reviewed even though raised for the first time on 
appeal, and will guarantee a consistent application of the 
3 
Court's waiver/procedural default rule. See State v. Anderson, 
789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990) (where the Court appropriately 
applied the waiver/procedural default rule to a constitutional 
claim raised for the first time on appeal and concludes that the 
3 
The importance of consistent application of a state procedural 
default rule is illustrated in Coleman v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377, 
1382-83 (10th Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 1835 (1990). 
There, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals made clear that the 
procedural default rule of Wainwriqht v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 
(1977), which bars federal habeas review when the state courts 
have declined to review an issue due to a procedural default by 
the defendant (e.g., failure to comply with a state 
contemporaneous objection rule), does not apply when the state 
procedural default rule has not been consistently applied. The 
existence of the Breckenridge liberty interest exception, which 
has already created an arguably inconsistent application of 
Utah's waiver/procedural default rule by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in Harrison and Hargraves, invites wholesale federal 
habeas review of this Court's and the court of appeals' decisions 
that have disposed of federal questions on the basis of waiver. 
That sort of pervasive review of state court decisions is clearly 
undesirable, in that it undermines the state's weighty interest 
in the finality of criminal judgments. See Boggess v. Morris, 
635 P.2d 39, 41 (Utah 1981) (emphasizing that "integrity of the 
criminal justice system requires a finality of judgment that 
should limit repetitive appeals and collateral attacks" once the 
normal appellate process has concluded). 
plain error rule was inapplicable). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
PRETRIAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously 
denied his pretrial motion to suppress his knife and a clothes 
bag containing a pair of pants and a shirt, all of which were 
seized in a warrantless search of a trailer at Western Brine 
Shrimp's camp on the Great Salt Lake. 
At the hearing on defendant's motion, the following 
relevant evidence was presented. Early in the morning on October 
26, 1989, several officers of the Box Elder County Sheriff's 
Department responded to a report of a possible assault at a 
Western Brine Shrimp camp located on the west shore of the Great 
Salt Lake. When the officers arrived, they noticed the dead 
victim on the ground and an individual, later identified as 
Raymond Cabututan, come out from between two of the trailers that 
were on the premises (there were a total of four trailers at the 
camp, which were referred to at the hearing as trailer #1, 
trailer #2, trailer #3, and trailer #4). Pursuant to the 
officers' order, defendant, Billy Cayer, and William Cummins 
4 
exited trailer #3. After the officers had conducted cursory 
searches of all four trailers to check for other individuals and 
weapons, they handcuffed defendant and the other three suspects 
and placed them in trailer #4 (Transcr. of Motion to Suppress 
4 
Cabututan, Cayer and Cummins, along with defendant, were 
charged with the murder of Miguel Ramirez (R. 2). 
Hearing 1/24/89 (hereafter "TA.M) 10-16). 
Defendant, who was an employee of Western Brine Shrimp 
("WBS"), lived with several other persons in trailer #3 while he 
was at the camp. WBS provided room and board to its employees 
(many of whom were transient workers) as part of their employment 
at the camp. Because trailer #3 had the best and biggest 
refrigerator, it was the primary location for storage of 
perishable food for the entire camp. Everyone at the camp had 
access to the food in trailer #3 even if they lived in another 
trailer. The door to trailer #3 was never locked, as none of the 
trailers had a lock. The business's radios which were used by 
those at the camp were stored in trailer #3 and accessible to 
everyone. According to one of the investigating officers, there 
appeared to be personal property in trailer #3. And, according 
to Richard Anderson, a resident of the camp at the time of the 
crimes, the common practice was to knock on the doors of the 
trailers before entering, and "[residents of the camp] had common 
respect not to go into somebody else's trailer unless they were 
there" (TA. 39, 51-53, 60, 66, 70). 
Two of the officers at the scene entered trailer #3 
pursuant to requests from certain of the suspects that cigarettes 
and medicine be retrieved for them. When the officers entered 
trailer #3 to look for those items, they observed in plain view a 
number of items that appeared to be evidence associated with the 
homicide of Miguel Ramirez (e.g., a cardboard box which appeared 
to have bloodstains on it, boots and tennis shoes which also 
appeared to have blood on them, a crescent wrench, and a knife); 
however, none of those items was seized at that time (TA. 28-29, 
74-76, 82, 85). 
After defendant and the other suspects were removed 
from the area, Officer Yeates, with assistance from Richard 
Anderson, entered trailer #3, picked up a radio, and then stepped 
back outside. Yeates contacted Pat Bentzley, one of the owner's 
of WBS and the manager of the business's property, and requested 
permission to search the trailers. Bentzley told him that the 
police could search all the trailers. Once Bentzley had granted 
this permission to the police, they entered trailer #3 without a 
warrant and seized various items, including the clothes bag that 
defendant argues the trial court should have suppressed. The 
following day, an officer returned to the scene, entered trailer 
#3 without a warrant, and seized the knife whose admission 
defendant also challenges on appeal (TA. 50, 58, 83-96). 
Although the trial court's oral ruling denying 
defendant's motion to suppress is not entirely clear with respect 
to some of its legal reasoning (e.g., the court's discussion of 
the search incident to arrest exception (TA. 119-20)), it very 
clearly holds that the warrantless searches of trailer #3 during 
which the clothes bag and knife were seized were lawful because 
they were conducted pursuant to the consent of Pat Bentzley who, 
as an owner of WBS and manager of its property, had 
actual authority to consent to a police entry into the common 
areas of the trailers. The court said: 
I do think that the consent can be given by 
anybody to the common areas of those 
buildings. I think the testimony is that 
people came and went, the[y] shared, they had 
company things stored in those areas[,] that 
they from time to time cooked for each other. 
And I don't think that the owner can give as 
much consent as he thinks he can. And that 
is, to go to anything that's located on the 
premises, I don't share that view. But I do 
think he can give consent to go into the 
common areas of the trailers and other things 
that he owns or controls there. Everybody 
else could. And certainly he could as well. 
And he can give consent for others to do 
that, in my judgment. . . . 
(TA. 118-19).5 
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court's 
denial of the motion to suppress cannot be sustained on any of 
the grounds relied upon by the trial court in concluding that the 
warrantless searches of trailer #3 were lawful: (1) search 
incident to arrest; (2) exigent circumstances; (3) plain view; 
and (4) consent of the owner. Because the court's reliance on 
Although oral rulings on motions to suppress are sometimes very 
clearly stated and thus easily reviewed by an appellate court, 
the oral ruling in this case is, at times, difficult to follow. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently recognized that, if the 
appellate courts are to conduct meaningful review of a trial 
court's ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must set 
forth clear findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of 
its ruling. See State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 n.l (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, denied, P.2d (Utah 1990) (recognizing 
need for clear and complete findings); State v. Lovegren, 798 
P.2d 767, 770-71 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (remanding case to trial 
court for entry of adequate findings in support of ruling on 
motion to suppress). This Court should adopt a similar 
requirement. And, while oral rulings may be sufficient in some 
cases, the better practice would be to enter a written order 
which clearly sets out, under separate headings, the predicate 
findings of fact and the ultimate conclusions of law. This is 
particularly true in a case such as this one, where multiple 
issues of fact and law are presented. 
Defendant's analysis of the search and seizure issue proceeds 
under fourth amendment law; he makes no effort to analyze the 
question under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Therefore, the State's response will necessarily be limited to a 
discussion of federal law. See State v. Lafferty# 749 P.2d 1239, 
1247 n.5 (Utah 1988) ("As a general rule, we will not engage in a 
the search incident to arrest and exigent circumstance exceptions 
to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement is questionable, 
the State will discuss only the court's determination that the 
search and seizure were lawful pursuant to valid consent and the 
7 
plain view doctrine. 
The central question is whether the court correctly 
concluded that Pat Bentzley, WBS owner and property manager, had 
actual authority to consent to the search by police of trailer 
#3. In short, did Bentzley have common authority with defendant 
and the other residents of the camp over at least the common 
areas of trailer #3? The standard for determining whether common 
authority exists was enunciated in United States v. Matlock, 415 
U.S. 164 (1974): 
The authority which justifies the third-party 
consent does not rest upon the law of 
property, with its attendant historical and 
legal refinements, . . . but rests rather on 
mutual use of the property by persons 
generally having joint access or control for 
most purposes, so that it is reasonable to 
recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has 
the right to permit the inspection in his own 
right and that the others have assumed the 
risk that one of their number might permit 
the common area to be searched. 
Id. at 171 n.7. See also State v. Johnson/ 748 P.2d 1069, 1073-
74 (Utah 1987). The State bears the burden of proving common 
authority, but it must do so by only a preponderance of the 
evidence. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 177. See also State v. Kendrick, 
Cont. state constitutional analysis unless an argument for 
different analyses under the state and federal constitutions are 
briefed."). 
7 
The prosecutor clearly concentrated on consent and plain view 
in his argument to the trial court (TA. 110-17). 
47 Wash.App. 620, 736 P.2d 1079, 1086 (1987). Under these 
standards, the trial court correctly concluded that the State had 
sustained its burden of proving that Bentzley had common 
authority over at least the common areas of trailer #3 and that 
he voluntarily consented to the police entry into the common 
9 areas• 
Trailer #3 was readily accessible to all employees of 
the camp, at least with respect to those parts of the trailer 
that contained the perishable food and the radios—items that 
were available to and used by all employees. Thus, there were 
recognized "common areas" within the trailer. Furthermore, the 
door to trailer #3 was never locked. And although courtesies 
such as not entering a trailer when its occupants were not there 
and knocking on a trailer's door before entering were generally 
followed by the camp's employees, there appears to be no dispute 
that any employee was free to enter trailer #3 at any time to 
obtain food or a radio. This same freedom of access would 
reasonably apply to the owner and manager of the property, Mr. 
It does not appear that this Court has ever expressly stated 
what burden of proof applies at a suppression hearing. However, 
in Matlock# the Supreme Court made clear that "the controlling 
burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater 
burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence." 415 U.S. 
at 178 n.14 (citing Lego v. Twomeyf 404 U.S. 477, 488-489 
(1972)). Based upon the rationale for the preponderance standard 
expressed in Lego, 404 U.S. at 486-87, this Court should 
expressly adopt a similar standard for Utah. See, e.g., United 
States v. Hurtadof 905 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990); State v. 
Cress, 576 A.2d 1366, 1367 (Me. 1990); State v. O'Dell, 576 A.2d 
425, 427 (R.I. 1990); People v. Henderson, 220 Cal.App.3d 1632, 
270 Cal.Rptr. 248, 257 (1990). 
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Defendant challenges only the trial court's conclusion that 
Bentzley had authority to consent to the search of the trailer; 
he does not question the voluntariness of that consent. 
Bentzley, who also had the status of employer. 
The common areas of trailer #3, which were associated 
with the employment activities of WBS (i.e., access to food was a 
benefit of employment and access to the radios was a necessary 
part of employment), are properly viewed as part of the business 
premises over which the employer/owner/manager would have common 
authority. See,, e.g., United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 
296-97 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding consent given by co-owner of 
hotel to search of office there used by manager of hotel, where 
hotel's records kept, and used by others as well for a variety of 
purposes); Donovan v. A.A. Biero Construction Co., 746 F.2d 894, 
898-900 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (D.C. government, for whom structure 
being built, could consent to search of common areas at 
construction site to which contractors and D.C. all had access); 
State v. Kendrick, 736 P.2d at 1086 (employer/owner had authority 
to consent to search of his premises where defendant employee had 
a "crash pad"). The situation here was not, as defendant 
suggests, a landlord-tenant relationship under which Bentzley, as 
a landlord, would not have had the authority to consent to a 
police search of the premises. See Chapman v. United States, 365 
U.S. 610 (1961); State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d 1, 432 P.2d 64, 66 
(1967). Nor was it a relationship akin to that which exists 
between a hotel and a guest, where the hotel is not free to 
consent to a police search of a rented room. See Stoner v. 
California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964). 
In sum, the trial court did not err in concluding that 
Bentzley had authority to consent to the search of trailer #3. 
- i f t -
Even if this Court were to decide that the trial 
court's conclusion was erroneous, admission of the challenged 
evidence would still be proper under Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 
S. Ct. 2793 (1990). There, the Supreme Court held that a police 
officer may validly search a place without a warrant pursuant to 
the consent of a person if the officer reasonably believes that 
the person has the authority to consent to the search, even 
though it may later be determined by a court that the person did 
not actually have such authority. The Court stated that a 
"determination of consent to enter must 'be judged against an 
objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at 
the moment . . . 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 
belief that the consenting party had authority over the 
premises?" 110 S. Ct. at 2801 (citation omitted). Applying this 
standard to the facts of the instant case, exclusion of the 
challenged evidence would not be warranted. Under the 
circumstances, it was reasonable for Officer Yeates, who received 
permission from Bentzley to search trailer #3, to believe that 
Bentzley, the owner/manager of the premises and defendant's 
employer, had authority to consent to the search. 
Finally, there is no merit to defendant's additional 
argument that, even if the officers were lawfully present in the 
trailer, they could not justifiably seize the clothes bag and the 
knife under the plain view doctrine. The plain view doctrine 
"allows the seizure of an item that is in the plain view of an 
officer who has lawfully entered the area and has probable cause 
to believe that the item is evidence of a crime." State v. 
Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 993 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). See 
also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987). Defendant does 
not claim that the clothes bag and the knife were not in plain 
view or that probable cause to believe they were evidence of a 
crime did not exist; he simply argues that those items were not 
observed until the police had entered the trailer with the 
purpose to search for and seize evidence. That the items were 
seen later rather than earlier does not invalidate the plain view 
seizure where the officers were lawfully in the trailer when they 
saw them. And, insofar as defendant's argument concerning the 
seizure of the knife suggests that the discovery of evidence in 
plain view must be inadvertent under the plain view doctrine, the 
United States Supreme Court recently held that inadvertence is 
not a necessary condition of a legitimate plain view seizure. 
Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE FOR APPEAL HIS 
CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT ADMITTED EVIDENCE 
OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR IN 
VIOLATION OF RULES 404 AND 405, UTAH RULES OF 
EVIDENCE. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously 
admitted evidence of defendant's prior aggressive behavior in 
violation of rules 404 and 405, Utah Rules of Evidence. However, 
this particular challenge to the evidence was not preserved for 
appeal• 
"Utah Rule of Evidence 103(a) requires 'a clear and 
definite objection' at trial to preserve an evidentiary error for 
appeal." State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert. 
denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989). To preserve a particular objection 
to evidence for appeal, a defendant must have specifically stated 
to the trial court the same grounds for objection presented on 
appeal. State v. Van Matre, 777 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989); State 
v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5, 14 (Utah 1984). Here, when the prosecution 
elicited evidence of defendant's prior aggressive behavior, 
defendant objected that the questioning was beyond the scope of 
cross-examination (T. 432); no rule 404 or rule 405 objection was 
made. Therefore, he is not entitled to assert a violation of 
those rules as a ground for error on appeal. Van Matre, 777 P.2d 
at 462.10 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT 
REVERSIBLE ERROR OCCURRED WHEN THE PROSECUTOR 
REFERRED TO HIM AS A "MAD DOG" IN CLOSING 
ARGUMENT. 
In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor at one 
point said in reference to defendant and his accomplices, "There 
isn't one of us here who knows how we would react in a situation 
like that with four mad dogs out there beating on someone" (T. 
911). Not immediately but shortly after that comment was made, 
defendant objected to the characterization "mad dogs" (T. 912). 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor's comment requires reversal 
of his convictions. 
This Court has recognized that "[c]ounsel for both 
sides have 'considerably more freedom in closing argument' and 'a 
Defendant does not assert that the Court should consider his 
argument under the plain error rule. See Utah R. Evid. 103(d); 
State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d at 35 (setting out requirements for 
demonstrating plain error). 
right to discuss fully from their standpoints the evidence and 
the inferences and deductions arising therefrom.'" State v, 
Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. 
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988) (quoting State v. 
Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973)). However, 
while some courts have approved a prosecutor's reference to the 
defendant as a "mad dog," see, e.g., Johnson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 
812, 295 S.E.2d 63, 69 (1982), most courts have disapproved of 
the use of that characterization in argument. See, e.g., Collier 
v. State, 103 Nev. 563, 747 P.2d 225, 227 (1987); State v. 
Hawkins, 292 S.C. 418, 357 S.E.2d 10, 12 (1987); State v. Music, 
79 Wash.2d 699, 489 P.2d 159, 170 (1971). Thus, the prosecutor's 
reference to defendant as a "mad dog" was probably improper. The 
real question is whether it constitutes reversible error. 
In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the 
Court "must determine if the prosecutor's remarks calls [sic] to 
the attention of the jurors matters they would not be justified 
in considering in reaching the verdict and, if so, whether there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the misconduct so prejudiced the 
jury that there would have been a more favorable result absent 
the misconduct." State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988) 
(citations omitted). Assuming that the prosecutor's reference to 
"mad dogs" was improper, there simply is no reasonable likelihood 
that the improper remark so prejudiced the jury that there would 
have been a more favorable result for defendant in its absence. 
There was substantial testimonial and physical evidence of 
defendant's guilt.11 See State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 
1984) ("'If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged 
conduct or remark will not be presumed prejudicial.'"). 
Furthermore, the prosecutor used the term "mad dogs" only once, a 
single remark that prompted neither an immediate objection nor a 
motion for mistrial from defendant. In short, the prosecutor's 
improper comment, standing alone, does not warrant reversal of 
defendant's convictions. See Collier v. State, 747 P.2d at 227 
(improper "mad dog" remark did not warrant reversal); State v. 
Gillihan, 86 N.M. 439, 524 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1974) (same); State 
v. Music, 489 P.2d at 170 (same). 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE FOR APPEAL HIS 
OBJECTION TO THE TRIAL COURT'S "ALLEN" 
INSTRUCTION. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously gave 
12 
an "Allen" instruction to the jury at the beginning of its 
Contrary to the suggestion in defendant's brief that the three 
eyewitnesses' testimony varied greatly on the issue of 
defendant's involvement in the beating of the victim, there was 
clear testimony from one eyewitness, Richard Anderson, which was 
not contradicted by the two other eyewitnesses, that defendant 
directly participated in the beating. Anderson, who was in one 
of the camp trailers and witnessed the brutal beating of the 
victim, repeatedly and positively identified defendant as one of 
several men who kicked, punched, and beat the victim (T. 301-
442). During the incident, he saw in defendant's hand a crescent 
wrench which was used on the victim (T. 319-20). Furthermore, he 
testified that when he encountered defendant shortly after the 
beating had ended, defendant said something on the order of 
"Yeah, we kicked that old boy['Js butt pretty bad" (T. 337). 
This direct evidence of defendant's guilt, standing alone, was 
compelling. 
1 2
 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). See also State 
v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1022 n.l (Utah 1987) (discussing 
"Allen" instruction); State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 29-31 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) (adopting modified "Allen" instruction for Utah). 
deliberations (see instruction no. 50; R. 417). However, he did 
not preserve this issue for appeal. 
"The usual rule is that '[n]o party may assign as error 
any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects 
thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the 
matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection.'" 
State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987) (quoting rule 
19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure). See also State v. 
John, 770 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 1989). Defendant did not object to 
Instruction No. 50 at trial; accordingly, the Court should not 
13 
consider his challenge to it for the first time on appeal. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN ALLOWING THE JURY TO DELIBERATE FOR AN 
EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME. 
Defendant argues that the trial court denied him due 
process and a fair trial under the state and federal 
constitutions by allowing the jury to deliberate continuously for 
13*$ hours after a full day of trial. The Court should summarily 
reject this argument. 
The jury apparently began its deliberations at 
approximately 5:30 p.m. (T. 942-43). At 3:30 a.m., after the 
jury had been deliberating for ten hours, defendant moved that 
the jury "be allowed to separate or be sequestered" (T. 942). 
The court indicated that it would have the bailiff check with the 
13 
Defendant does not argue that, even in the absence of an 
objection below, the Court should consider his challenge to the 
instruction under rule 19(c)'s "manifest injustice" exception to 
the waiver rule. Thus, the Court should dispose of defendant's 
argument on the basis of waiver. 
jurors and determine whether they wished to continue their 
deliberations (T. 943). At 4:30 a.m., the bailiff reported that, 
when asked whether they had reached a verdict and how they were 
coming, the jurors indicated that they "were moving along" and 
"shouldn't be much longer" (T. 943-44). At 6:45 a.m., the jury 
returned its verdicts (T. 944-46). 
The question of how long to keep the jury in 
deliberations is discretionary with the trial court. State v. 
Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 31 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Munden v. State, 
698 P.2d 621, 625-26 (Wyo. 1985). Given that the jurors did not 
indicate a desire to discontinue their deliberations, and in fact 
indicated that they were nearing verdicts after approximately 
eleven hours of deliberations, the court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing them to continue over defendant's 
objection. Other courts have upheld trial court decisions to 
keep the jury in deliberations for comparably long periods of 
time. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 66 Or.App. 374, 675 P.2d 1060, 
1066 (11 hours of deliberation), review denied, 297 Or. 339, 683 
P.2d 1370 (1984); Farmer v. State, 95 Nev. 849, 603 P.2d 700, 704 
(1979) (12 hours of deliberation the day before verdict returned 
and 9 hours day of verdict). Defendant has not demonstrated that 
the court's ruling denied him due process or a fair trial under 
14 the state and federal constitutions. The single case he relies 
upon, Isom v. State, 481 So.2d 820 (Miss. 1985), is 
Defendant fails to support his allegation of a constitutional 
violation with legal analysis or authority. Thus, the Court 
could decline to consider his claim on this basis alone. State 
v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
distinguishable from his case, in that there the court kept the 
jury in deliberations for an excessive period even though three 
jurors desired to recess. Id. at 824. 
POINT VI 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. 
Defendant claims that the State presented insufficient 
evidence to support his conviction of aggravated assault because 
the evidence did not establish that he exhibited "a show of 
immediate force or violence." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1)(b) 
(1990). 
This Court will not reverese a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence unless the evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, is "sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted." State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 
(Utah 1985) (citations omitted). Here, Richard Anderson, the 
victim of defendant's aggravated assault, testified that when he 
stepped from his trailer to investigate the beating that was 
occurring outside a short distance away, defendant raised a 
crescent wrench he had in his right hand, pulled it back, and 
said to Anderson, "Do you want some of this too?" (T. 319-20). 
Based on that evidence, the jury could have reasonably found that 
defendant had made "a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence," section 76-5-102(1)(b), such that he was 
guilty of an assault. Contrary to defendant's suggestion, 
defendant's conduct was not, as a matter of law, only a violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (1990) . See State v. Verdin, 595 
P.2d 862 (Utah 1979). As noted in Verdin, "The distinctions in 
levels of proscribed conduct [in sections 76-5-103(1)(b) 
(aggravated assault) and 76-10-506] are clear and easily 
comprehended." jEd. at 862. Even though the jury could have 
convicted defendant of a violation of section 76-10-506 (see 
instruction no. 17; R. 379), the evidence presented established 
all the elements of aggravated assault and it was within the 
jury's prerogative to find the more serious crime. Ibid. 
Therefore, defendant's insufficiency claim is without merit. 
POINT VII 
BECAUSE IT APPEARS FROM THE RECORD THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32A-3 
(1990) IN ORDERING THAT DEFENDANT REIMBURSE 
THE COUNTY FOR THE COSTS OF HIS DEFENSE, THIS 
COURT SHOULD REMAND THE CASE TO THE TRIAL 
COURT FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THIS ASPECT OF 
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE. 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion in ordering him to reimburse the county for the costs 
of his defense pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-32a-l and -2 
(1990) (T. 953-54). 
An appellate court will set aside a sentence imposed by 
a trial court only if the sentence represents an abuse of 
Section 76-10-506 provides: 
Every person, except those persons 
described in Section 76-10-503, who, not in 
necessary self defense in the presence of two 
or more persons, draws or exhibits any 
dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening 
manner or unlawfully uses the same in any 
fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
discretion, if the trial court fails to consider all relevant 
factors, or if the sentence imposed exceeds the limits prescribed 
by law. State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989). 
Here, it does not appear from the record that the trial court 
adequately considered defendant's financial status before 
assessing defendant the costs of his defense. Utah Code Ann. 
S 77-32a-3 (1990) provides: 
The court shall not include in the 
judgment a sentence that a defendant pay 
costs unless the defendant is or will be able 
to pay them. In determining the amount and 
method of payment of costs, the court shall 
take account of the financial resources of 
the defendant and the nature of the burden 
that payment of the costs will impose and 
that restitution be the first priority. 
The court did not comply with this section before ordering 
payment of costs (T. 953-55). Accordingly, defendant's case 
should be remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of that 
order in light of section 77-32a-3. 
POINT VIII 
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE FOR APPEAL THE 
ISSUE OF WHETHER IT WAS APPROPRIATE FOR A 
PART-TIME CITY ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT 
DEFENDANT AS APPOINTED COUNSEL; 
ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE 
THAT GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL EXIST ON THE BASIS 
OF THE RECORD BEFORE THIS COURT. 
Defendant contends that he was denied due process when 
the court appointed as his trial counsel Thomas Willmore who, he 
claims, was a part-time city attorney and prosecutor. He argues 
that Mr. Willmore's part-time employment as a prosecutor 
constituted an inherent conflict of interest which may have 
prejudiced defendant. 
The Court need not, in the context of this case, 
address the question of whether it is appropriate for a 
prosecutor from another jurisdiction to represent a criminal 
defendant as appointed or retained counsel. First, defendant did 
not preserve this issue for review, having not objected to Mr. 
Willmore's appointment on that basis below. It is well settled 
that, absent exceptional circumstances, this Court will not 
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990); State v. Steqqell, 660 
P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983). Defendant does not allege any 
exceptional circumstances that would relieve him of the waiver, 
and there appear to be none. Second, the record in this case 
does not establish that Mr. Willmore was a part-time city 
attorney and prosecutor at the time he was appointed to represent 
defendant. The exchange that Mr. Willmore had with a prospective 
juror during jury voir dire (T. 84-86), which defendant now 
claims demonstrates that Willmore was a part-time city prosecutor 
at the time he represented defendant, indicates nothing more than 
that Willmore had prosecuted the juror's family member the 
previous year for Garland City. With nothing more than this 
brief exchange during voir dire to support his contention 
regarding Willmore's alleged status as a prosecutor, defendant is 
in no positon to ask this Court to review his conflict of 
interest claim. See State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 
(Utah 1982) ("This Court simply cannot rule on a question which 
depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the 
record."), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983). 
POINT IX 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE WAS 
DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT 
TRIAL. 
Defendant claims he was denied effective assistcince of 
counsel at trial because his appointed counsel was not adequately 
prepared to cross-examine two of the State's witnesses and, 
despite defendant's request, declined to call a particular 
witness. 
As defendant points out, his pretrial request to 
represent himself was granted by the court after it had conducted 
The State would note in passing that although some courts have 
found that representation of a criminal defendant by an attorney 
who is also a prosecutor is not prohibited as a matter of law, 
see, e.g., Caffrey v. Solem, 400 N.W.2d 281 (S.D. 1987) (the 
defendant's representation at new trial by court-appointed 
attorney who had been appointed state's attorney for adjoining 
county during pendency of appeal of original conviction did not 
constitute conflict of interest); State v. Mitchell, 356 So.2d 
974, 977 (La.) (assistant city prosecutor is not prohibited from 
defending a criminal prosecution in state district court), cert. 
denied, 356 U.S. 974 (1978), the better view appears to be that, 
due to the inherent potential for conflict of interest, a public 
prosecutor should not defend or assist in the defense of persons 
accused of crime, see, e.g., Howerton v. State, 640 P.2d 566 
(Okl. Cr. 1982) (a member of the bar who is a part-time district 
attorney may not be appointed to defend persons either within or 
outside jurisdiction in which he or she serves as assistant 
district attorney); People v. Rhodes, 115 Cal.Rptr. 235, 524 P.2d 
363 (1974) (city attorney with prosecutorial responsibilities may 
not defend or assist in the defense of persons accused of crime; 
nature and duties of a public prosecutor are inherently 
incompatible with the obligations of a criminal defense counsel). 
See also Rule 1.7, Rules of Professional Conduct. Indeed, Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-18-2(10)(a) (Supp. 1990) states that "[a] county 
attorney may not in any manner consult, advise, counsel, or 
defend within this state any person charged with any crime, 
misdemeanor, or breach of any penal statute or ordinance[.]" 
However, there appears to be no similar statutory restriction on 
city attorneys. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (Supp. 1990) 
(setting forth prosecutorial powers and duties of city attorney). 
the necessary on-the-record inquiry (Transcr. 2/8/90 (hereafter 
"TB.") 3-26). See State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187-88 (Utah 
1987). Although the court granted defendant's request for self-
representation , it allowed defendant to have his appointed 
counsel conduct opening and closing statements and to conduct the 
examinations of certain witnesses; defendant was allowed to 
examine the witnesses he wished to as part of his self-
representation (TB. 22-23, 26-27; T. 20, 173). This initial 
arrangement amounted to hybrid representation, something to which 
defendant was not constitutionally entitled. United States v. 
Hill, 526 F.2d 1019, 1024-25 (10th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 425 
U.S. 940 (1976); Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 198-99 (Del. 
1980). See also LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure § 11.5(f) 
(1984). 
In arguing that he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel, defendant first focuses on the cross-examinations of 
Richard Anderson and Eric Tilley, who were prosecution witnesses 
(T. 398, 497). Br. of Appellant at 17. After defendant had 
cross-examined Anderson, defendant's appointed counsel, Thomas 
Willmore, requested and ultimately received permission to conduct 
additional cross-examination of the witness (T. 386, 388, 393-
96). During the in-chambers conference where the court granted 
that permission, defendant indicated that he desired for Mr. 
Willmore to take over completely his representation at trial (T. 
397). The following exchange took place: 
[Defendant]: I'll turn the trial over to Mr. 
Willmore, the whole entire thing. 
The Court: Is that your desire? 
[Defendant]: That's my desire. 
The Court: I'd certainly advise you to do 
that. 
The Court: Are you prepared to do that, Tom? 
Mr. Willmore: I wasn't prepared to question 
Richard Anderson and Eric Tilley, but i will 
do it. 
The Court: Of course you've been to the 
preliminary hearing, you have the benefit of 
the transcript of their testimony — 
Mr. Willmore: Yes. 
The Court: — Three other times. 
Mr. Willmore: I've gone over it all, but as 
far as being prepared to the point where I 
normally am, what I would like to be, I am 
not. But I will go ahead, if that's what Don 
[the defendant] wants. 
[Defendant]: That's right. 
The Court: You can choose. I'll let you 
choose. 
[Defendant]: I choose Mr. Willmore. 
The Court: [I]f you're willing to do it. 
Mr. Willmore: Don would rather I do — 
The Court: Fine. All right. That's what 
we'll do from this point. 
(T. 397-98). 
Thus, although defendant fails to make it clear in his 
brief, Mr. Willmore, at the time he cross-examined Anderson and 
at all times thereafter, acted as defendant's counsel, and 
defendant no longer represented himself. 
Defendant alleges that Mr. Willmore's cross-
examinations of Anderson and Tilley constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel because Willmore indicated that he was not 
as prepared as he might otherwise have been to examine those 
witnesses. However, he levels this allegation with absolutely no 
discussion of the cross-examinations actually conducted by Mr. 
Willmore or how those examinations were either deficient or 
prejudicial. 
A defendant who raises a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel must show both that counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and that a 
reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's deficient 
performance, the result of the trial would have been different. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); State v. Carter, 
776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 
(Utah 1986). A "[d]efendant must prove that specific, identified 
acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance. The claim may not be speculative, but must 
be a demonstrative reality[.],f Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. And, the 
deficient performance must be so prejudicial as "to undermine 
confidence in the reliability of the verdict." Ibid. 
Here, defendant fails to meet either the deficient 
performance prong or the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. 
As to his claim regarding counsel's allegedly deficient cross-
examination of two prosecution witnesses, defendant does not 
identify how counsel's performance was deficient, and does not 
articulate how it was prejudicial beyond his speculative, 
unsupported assertion that M[c]areful, well-prepared cross-
examination would probably have shown at most, that Defendant's 
conduct was • • . manslaughter, or . . . aggravated assault." 
Br. of Appellant at 19-20. 
Defendant's additional claim of ineffectiveness is 
similarly without merit. He argues that he was denied effective 
assistance because counsel, despite defendant's request, declined 
to call as a defense witness Ray Cabututan who, along with 
defendant and others, was charged with the murder of Miguel 
Ramirez (R. 2-3). Referring to page 270 of an uncertified 
transcript which purportedly reflects Cabututan's testimony at 
Cabututan's separate trial, defendant seemingly suggests that 
Cabututan's testimony concerning a wrench would have been helpful 
to defendant. Br. of Appellant at 18-19. While defendant's 
failure to analyze the significance of this purported testimony 
would alone be an adequate ground for rejecting his 
ineffectiveness claim, the Court should decline to consider the 
claim because it is not adequately supported by the record. 
First, the transcript attached as Exhibit B to 
defendant's brief is neither certified nor part of the record on 
appeal. An even more fundamental defect in the transcript is 
that it does not identify the witness who is testifying. In 
short, defendant fails to support his claim concerning 
Cabututan's purported testimony with an adequate record on 
appeal. Accordingly, this Court should not review the claim. 
State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985). Furthermore, 
defendant provides no record support for his assertion that he 
asked counsel to call Cabututan as a witness, and that counsel 
declined. It is well settled that this Court cannot consider 
matters outside of the record. State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 
(Utah 1986); State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the Court should 
affirm defendant's convictions and remand the case to the trial 
court for reconsideration of the order assessing defense costs to 
defendant as part of his sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /^^day of February, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON fl 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Nathan Hult, Attorney for Appellant, 326 North 100 East, Logan, 
Utah 84321, this of February, 1991. 
~kohL*/j y£>.^^ZTTor. 
